Uddhav Thackeray & the Law — Questions Raised Over Having Two Deputy CMs

When Uddhav Thackeray first assumed office as Chief Minister of Maharashtra in November 2019, one of the notable features of his cabinet was the presence of two Deputy Chief Ministers (Dy CMs) — a power-sharing device intended to satisfy coalition partners and regional balance. But that arrangement also invited legal and constitutional scrutiny. Over time, as the Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA) government faced crises and defections, several deeper questions have surfaced about the legality, propriety, and precedents of having dual deputies.

Below is a pointed exploration — question by question — of the law, possible precedents, and controversies surrounding the dual Deputy CM model under Uddhav Thackeray.

Is having two Deputy Chief Ministers constitutionally or legally permissible?

• The Indian Constitution does not explicitly provide for the post of “Deputy Chief Minister.” The creation of such a position is a matter of political convention, dependent on ministerial portfolios and internal structuring within a state.
• However, some legal experts say that while there is flexibility, the state must respect limits on total ministers (both maximum and minimum) as provided in Article 164 and related rules.
• For example, in the later Shinde government, critics argued that a two-member Ministry (i.e. one CM + two deputies) violated the minimum numbers required for a valid ministry. They claimed decisions taken in such a minimal cabinet might lack constitutional validity.
• In short: there is no per se prohibition, but the arrangement must not run afoul of broader constitutional constraints (e.g. minimum/maximum size of the cabinet, collective responsibility, etc.).

Key question: Did Uddhav’s cabinet — with two Dy CMs — at any point violate the minimum threshold of ministers required by law?

What was the political logic behind two Deputy CMs in Uddhav’s cabinet?

• From a political standpoint, Uddhav’s coalition (Shiv Sena + NCP + Congress) required delicate balance among parties and regions. Offering two Deputy CM posts helped placate multiple power centers and maintain internal equilibrium.
• Earlier in 2019, there was speculation (and reported negotiation) that the BJP, in coalition discussions, also considered a dual deputy CM formula to break logjams.
• In Maharashtra’s politics, symbolic representation (marshalling caste/regional equations) often shapes the structure of ministry, and dual Dy CMs can be tools to balance competing demands.

Key question: Was the decision purely political convenience, or was there any legal drafting or precedent considered before announcing two deputies?

On what constitutional / statutory basis does a state recognize two Dy CMs?

• As noted, the constitution is silent on the “Deputy CM” post. The appointments are made under Article 164 (which governs ministers in state) and the state’s rules of business or governor’s orders.
• The key constraints are:
  1. The chief minister and ministers must be members (or become members within 6 months) of the state legislature.
  2. The size constraint: a state cabinet must not exceed 15 % of the assembly’s strength, but also many states prescribe a minimum number of ministers. Maharashtra was argued to have a minimum of 12, so a minimal two-member cabinet (CM + 2 Dy CMs) later raised eyebrows.
  3. The principle of collective responsibility and internal checks: having multiple deputies should not create ambiguity in authority, decision‐making or breach the norms of collegiate governance in state executive.

Key question: Did Uddhav’s government maintain internal clarity about divisions of power and respect those checks, especially in times of crisis?

During the 2022 political crisis, did the dual Dy CMs model help or hinder constitutional stability?

• The 2022 “Maha coup” in Maharashtra, led by Eknath Shinde’s revolt, deeply tested the stability of the Uddhav government.
• Uddhav’s government had Dy CM Ajit Pawar (from NCP) besides other ministers. As MLAs defected, questions of anti-defection law, disqualification proceedings, and majority tests came to a head.
• In the Supreme Court proceedings, arguments were raised about the legitimacy of Thackeray’s continuation, even after losing support: “when the leader has lost majority, how can he (Uddhav) be allowed to act as CM even for a single day?”
• The multi‐Deputy structure may have diluted authority, made internal coordination more complex, and contributed to ambiguity about who wielded real power at critical junctures.

Key question: In times of constitutional stress, did dual Dy CMs amplify confusion rather than strengthen resolve?

Are decisions taken by a cabinet including two Dy CMs more vulnerable to legal challenge?

• Because the Dy CM posts are not constitutionally entrenched, decisions made in such a structure may be challenged on grounds of invalid constitution of the ministry, or lack of quorum, or breach of procedural norms.
• Indeed, critics have questioned whether a two-minister cabinet (i.e. only CM + 2 Dy CMs) satisfies the constitutional minimum for ruling legitimacy.
• But a multi-minister cabinet (as Uddhav’s was initially) gives more buffer — so long as proper procedures are followed, legal immunity is greater.
• Public interest litigations could probe whether certain portfolios or orders were validly exercised if chain of command or delegation was opaque.

Key question: Did any court ever flag or stay Uddhav-era executive orders citing invalid cabinet structure under his dual Dy CM model?

What precedents exist — in Maharashtra or elsewhere — for having multiple Deputy CMs?

• Multiple states have adopted dual Deputy CMs (especially in coalition governments) as political devices, though legal challenges are rare.
• In Maharashtra itself, having more than one Deputy CM is not wholly novel in coalition politics, though the Thackeray era made it more visible.
• The longevity and legal resilience of such arrangements depend largely on internal clarity, legislative support, and absence of constitutional conflict over ministerial limits.
• The question becomes whether courts will enforce stricter scrutiny when political breakdown occurs, and whether precedent will reshape executive structuring norms.

Key question: If other states (or Maharashtra earlier) have done this without legal backlash, is the Thackeray case uniquely vulnerable — or is it simply being tested by the crisis?

Post-2022: Did the collapse of Uddhav’s Thackeray government retroactively validate or invalidate the two-Dy CM model?

• When Thackeray resigned in June 2022 and Shinde assumed the CM post (with new Dy CMs and alliances), the Uddhav model was supplanted.
• In legal reviews of the events (e.g. in Supreme Court writs), the validity of previous decisions, disqualification petitions, and claims of legitimate authority have been debated.
• In effect, the dual Dy CM structure was not separately struck down; rather the broader coalition fracture and defections invited judicial scrutiny of defection laws and legitimacy of government formation.
• But the crisis certainly exposed weaknesses: any structural ambiguity in authority or delegation under dual deputies may have compounded confusion and legal challenge.

Key question: Could parts of Uddhav-era executive action be invalidated in future if courts find procedural or structural defects tied to the dual deputation?

What lessons and reforms might emerge from the Thackeray experiment?

• Going forward, states and coalitions might codify clearer rules on how many deputies can be appointed, how portfolios are allocated, and how authority is delegated among CM, Dy CMs, and ministers.
• Legislative or constitutional reform could consider whether the Deputy CM post (or multiple such posts) should be formally recognized with limits to reduce ambiguity.
• State rulebooks (rules of business, council of ministers procedures) should explicitly define the chain of command, roles, and thresholds, especially in coalition setups.
• The judiciary, by probing executive actions during crises, may create case law that either endorses or curtails dual Deputy CM models in future.